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Even in a floating foreign exchange rate regime, monetary 
authorities sometimes intervene in the currency market due 
to liquidity demand and foreign exchange crises. Typically, 
central banks intervene using foreign currency trades and/or 
by changing domestic interest rates. We discuss this 
framework in the context of an optimal impulse stochastic 
control model. The control and performance equations 
include interventions with swap operations in the domestic 
market, since the Central Bank of Brazil also uses these 
operations. We evaluate risk management strategies for 
central bank interventions in case of crisis based on the 
model. We conclude that the Brazilian risk management 
strategy of increasing holdings of international reserves and 
decreasing short foreign exchange rate exposure in 
domestic public debt after 2004 gave the country more 
flexibility to manage foreign exchange rate risk in 2008 and 
to avoid higher interest rates to attract international capital 
as was necessary in previous crises. 
Keywords ou Palavras-chave:  foreign exchange rate, 
intervention, central bank 
JEL Classification ou Classificação JEL: C51, C52, C61, 
E58, F31 
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The 1970s witnessed a change in the international monetary system from a regime of 
pegged exchange rates, which had prevailed since the Bretton Woods Conference. 
During the 1970s exchange rates fluctuated widely (Frenkel, 1981). Research into 
exchange rates tries to explain their behavior in response to several mechanisms using 
structural and equilibrium models, purchasing power parity, covered and uncovered 
interest rate parity, the monetary approach and the portfolio balance approach among 
others. For a detailed review of foreign exchange rate literature since the 1970's see 
Taylor (1995). Meese and Rogoff (1983) introduced an inflection point into this subject 
as they support the idea that a random walk model is the best alternative for exchange 
rate behavior modeling. It is difficult to beat the random walk exchange rate forecast 
because the relationship between the nominal exchange rate and the fundamental 
underlying macroeconomic conditions may be inherently non-linear (Kilian and Taylor, 
2003).  
According to Turnovsky and Grinols (1996) an extensive literature analyzing 
optimal exchange rate intervention evolved during the 1980's. This literature contributed 
to the debate over fixed versus flexible rates and the authors argued that the existing 
models suffered from several limitations since underlying assumptions were usually 
some variant of the static IS-LM model or based on a mean-variance framework. 
However, the authors stated that the optimal exchange rate regime, attained by an 
optimal monetary intervention rule, would be critically dependent upon the nature, the 
sources and the relative sizes of the stochastic disturbance affecting the economy which 
would not be covered by the standard literature. 
New approaches to exchange rate modeling emerged and estimation of 
parameters and stochastic calculus became important subjects (Krugman and Miller, 
1992). In this context, a target zone exchange rate model emerged in the 1980s and it 
was formalized by Krugman (1991). Flood and Garber (1991) defined the target zone as 
a non-linear compromise between fixed exchange rates and freely floating exchange 
rates. According to Krugman (1991) a target zone differs from a fixed rate regime in 
allowing a fairly wide range of variation for the exchange rate around a reference rate
1. 
So, some exchange rate flexibility is allowed and interventions in the exchange rate are 
                                                 
1 This range is commonly called an exchange rate band. 5 
 
more an occasional problem than a continuous preoccupation. Svensson (1992) 
discusses the exchange rate band as a way to monetary independence in spite of fixed 
exchange rates. However, target zone literature assumes that the band and intervention 
policies are exogenously given (Jeanblanc-Picqué, 1993). 
In fact there is a huge debate on the efficacy of foreign exchange rate 
intervention but even in a floating exchange rate regime, central banks usually intervene 
in the foreign exchange rate
2. One kind of intervention is the purchase or sale of foreign 
currency. If a central bank purchases foreign currency, it is expected that there will be 
domestic currency depreciation. Furthermore, it would expand the domestic money 
supply unless it is offset by the sale of domestic bonds
3. This type of intervention will 
increase international reserves. There are studies suggesting that sterilized interventions 
rarely work, as Flood and Marion (2002) stated. Since there is uncertainty about the link 
between exchange rates and economic fundamentals, interventions may send signals 
which tend to confirm coordinating agents' expectations, inducing them to converge on 
a particular model of the economy and pick a value for the exchange rate that is similar 
to that targeted by the monetary authority. Evidence for the effectiveness of official 
intervention is unclear, although some recent studies do suggest a significant link 
between interventions and the foreign exchange rate
4. Indeed, after the meeting of G-5 
economic leaders in 1985 led to the Plaza Accord, intervention in the markets for major 
exchange rates has been regular and, at times, heavy (Taylor, 1995).  
According to Cadenillas and Zapatero (2000), the use of impulse control theory 
to model exchange rate behavior began with Jeanblanc-Picqué (1993). Her model works 
with a stochastic process for the exchange rate and in order to keep it within a given 
band the monetary authority uses impulse control methods, i.e. interventions in the 
foreign exchange market. There is a cost associated with each intervention and this cost 
is minimized. This cost has two components: a fixed cost plus a cost proportional to the 
size of intervention. Since there is a fixed cost, the optimal policy is not an infinite 
                                                 
2 For an analysis of the rationale of interventions see Dominguez and Frankel (1993a,b) and Taylor 
(1995). 
3 Non-sterilized intervention occurs when the effects of foreign exchange market intervention on the 
money supply are not neutralized. 
4 Karunaratne (1996), for instance, postulates an optimal control model to test the proposition of 
ineffectiveness of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) intervention. It used multi-cointegration 
techniques to test whether the stochastic process of RBA intervention exhibits long-run equilibrium 
relations and the test results supported the effectiveness of interventions. 6 
 
number of interventions. Jeanblanc-Picqué proves the existence of an optimal policy 
based on an impulse control method. Optimal impulse control problems have only 
appeared in the literature recently. Aubin (2000) discusses quasi-variational inequalities 
as a viable approach to solve optimal impulse control problems and emphasizes that this 
approach was developed in the 1970's. 
This paper discusses a model for optimal exchange rate intervention based on the 
impulse control theory. We use an impulse stochastic control problem to analyze 
Brazilian risk management strategy for managing the risk of foreign exchange rate 
exposure in recent years. In the impulse stochastic control problem there is an equation 
that describes the control function and another that describes the cost function. Then, 
based on the previous estimation and calibration of these equations, we discuss risk 
management strategies for the Central Bank of Brazil and we evaluate Brazilian risk 
management strategy in the 2008 international financial crisis. 
2- The Impulse Stochastic Control Problem 
Mundaca and Oksendal (1998), hereinafter MO, describe an optimal intervention policy 
for central banks in order to stabilize the exchange rate. Their paper differs from that of 
Jeanblanc-Picqué (1993) in the sense that it allows for two types of control, namely 
discrete time foreign exchange interventions with foreign currency trades, and 
continuous exchange rate control with domestic interest rates. Another difference is that 
the exchange rate band is not exogenous, but is a result of the solution of the optimal 
stochastic intervention control problem. 
Optimal central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market is also studied 
in Cadenillas and Zapatero (1999, 2000), hereinafter CZ. Their first paper uses only 
impulse control, as in Jeanblanc-Picqué (1993). Their second paper uses classical 
(continuous control with interest rate) and impulse (using international reserves) 
stochastic control, as in MO. Both CZ papers consider the exchange rate to be a 
geometric Brownian motion rather than a pure Brownian motion and that the costs of 
interventions by purchasing foreign currency are lower than the costs of selling it, which 
in some cases may be closer to reality for emerging economies, since purchasing foreign 
currency increases international reserves. Furthermore, they give numerical examples 
and evaluate the model based on those examples. Unfortunately, those numerical 
examples are for didactic purposes only and do not reflect any real economy. 7 
 
The above literature on optimal intervention control of foreign exchange rates is 
based on the target zone model. It assumes that the monetary authority intervenes in 
order to keep the exchange rate within a band. However, as pointed out by MO the 
currency band is not necessarily credible and may be exposed to speculative attacks. 
Speculative attacks are not rare in emerging economies and central banks often use 
domestic interest rates and international reserves to defend against them. In this paper 
we use the MO model with a geometric Brownian motion as in the CZ papers. A 
geometric Brownian motion allows us to simulate speculative attacks and to check the 
behavior of the model in reaction to a disturbance function since we may include a drift.  
Here we consider that in exchange rate crisis events, the monetary authority may 
use two kinds of controls. The first one is a continuous control using the interest rate (rs) 
and the second one is an impulse control with interventions in the foreign exchange 
market and domestic bond market and/or swaps (ξ's). Hereinafter, impulse control 
based on foreign currency trading is also called spot intervention. We also consider that 
the central bank puts into effect impulse control through purchases or sales of domestic 
currency bonds or swaps that pay foreign exchange rate fluctuations, hereinafter called 
swap or bond interventions
5. We define the exchange rate Yt as domestic currency units 
per unit of foreign currency at time t, and we assume that Y is a stochastic process given 
by: 
∑ ∑ ∫ ∫
≤ ≤
















, 1 1 0 0      ( 1 )    
where, 
Yt  is the exchange rate stochastic process starting at y; 
p  is the exogenous economic pressure on the exchange rate; 
b.rs  is the influence of interest rate (rs) on the exchange rate. Here interest rate 
corresponds to the difference between domestic and foreign interest rates; 
σ  is a positive constant; 
Bt  is the Brownian motion; 
                                                 
5 The Central Bank of Brazil for instance has been using swap operations since 2002 and these operations 
are a kind of non deliverable forward. 8 
 
a1.ξ1  is the influence of interventions on the exchange rate of buying (ξ<0) or selling 
(ξ>0) a total amount ξ of foreign currency; 
a2.ξ2  is the influence of interventions on the exchange rate of buying (ξ<0) or selling 
(ξ>0) a total amount ξ of swaps between foreign exchange rates and interest 
rates in local currency, and bonds in domestic currency that pay foreign 
exchange rate changes. 
s  is an instant of time. 
Exogenous economic pressure on the exchange rate p and additional impulse 
control  ξ2 are introduced as modifications to the model given in MO. For optimal 
control it is necessary to establish a cost function which is to be minimized and the 
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where, ρ is the discount rate, m is an implicit (not revealed) target value for exchange 
rate, 
_
r  is a reference value for the interest rate
6 and k, β, λ1, λ2, c1, c2   are the cost 
function parameters. We assume that the system starts at the state x=(s,y). T  ∞ ≤  is a 
given (fixed) future time and E
(s,y) is the expectation with respect to the probability law 
of Yt.. 
The model was used to analyze Brazilian foreign exchange market features in 
the floating regime period, with a specific cost function, where the size of interventions 
have a quadratic effect, rather than a linear one as in the CZ and MO examples. 
Furthermore, an additional kind of exchange rate intervention was included in the 
model: domestic bonds and swaps settled in domestic currency. The Central Bank of 
Brazil uses this kind of intervention as a complementary tool to defend against foreign 
exchange rate speculative attacks. The solution of the optimal impulse stochastic control 
problem is presented in Appendix I. This model is discussed in Silva Junior, Cajueiro 
and Yoneyama (2004) and in Silva Junior (2005). 
 
                                                 
6 We consider this reference rate to be equal to zero, as a simplification attained by axis translation. 9 
 
3. Simulation of Risk Management Strategies 
 
Brazil has had a floating foreign exchange rate regime since January 1999, although the 
central bank has intervened in the domestic dollar market due to liquidity demand and 
foreign exchange crises. Since January 1999 there have been four periods of foreign 
exchange rate stress. The first one occurred in January 1999 itself and it caused a 
change from a fixed to a floating foreign exchange rate regime. The second one was due 
to Argentinian crisis in 2001, the third one occurred before the Brazilian presidential 
elections in 2002 and the last one was due to the international financial crisis in 2008. 
Table 1 shows BRL depreciation in the four periods. 
Table 1 – BRL depreciation against USD 
Period Min Max Change
31/12/98 30/03/99 1.207 2.164 79.3%
31/10/00 28/09/01 1.909 2.801 46.7%
01/03/02 28/02/03 2.271 3.955 74.2%
02/06/08 16/11/09 1.559 2.500 60.4%  
As discussed above one way to intervene in the foreign exchange rate is the use 
of interest rates since this influences the flow of foreign capital. The use of interest rates 
to control the exchange rate is a kind of continuous control, or classical stochastic 
control. Higher domestic interest rates induce foreign capital inflows attracted by better 
yields. On the other hand, they will constrain economic growth and increase domestic 
debt. In fact, interest rates are often used to control inflation, i.e. as monetary policy, 
rather than foreign exchange rate control. Nevertheless, in periods of speculative 
currency attacks, interest rates may be used to avoid severe currency depreciation in 
emerging market economies.  
Typically many central banks in emerging market economies also intervene in 
the foreign exchange rate by using foreign currency trades. Thus, international reserves 
are used as insurance against crises since they may be used to smooth foreign exchange 
rate changes.  
The Central Bank of Brazil also intervenes in the domestic market with swap 
operations. This means that if the demand from non-financial firms for foreign currency 
is high, they may agree to a swap operation for hedging purposes settled in the domestic 
currency with a financial firm. In this case the non-financial firm receives the gains or 10 
 
accepts the losses arising from foreign exchange rate fluctuations and pays interest (see 
figure 1). The Central Bank may also sell foreign currency (international reserves) in the 
spot market. Alternatively, if non-financial firms are concerned by the high inflow of 
foreign currency and the appreciation of the domestic currency, they may agree to swap 
operations for hedging purposes, transferring the gains or losses arising from foreign 
exchange rate fluctuations to financial firms and receiving interest (figure 2). The 
Central Bank may also buy foreign currency in the spot market which will increase 
holdings of international reserves. The financial sector cannot absorb all of the market 
risk and the Central Bank of Brazil plays the role of the hedge supplier, as shown in 

























Figure 1 – Swaps operations of the Central Bank of Brazil (Central Bank is short 
























Figure 2 – Swaps operations of the Central Bank of Brazil (Central Bank is long foreign 
exchange rate) 
 
To simulate the model from equations (1) and (2) we need to identify the 
parameters of equation (1) and to calibrate the parameters of equation (2). Silva Junior, 
Cajueiro and Yoneyama (2004) and Silva Junior (2005) did that based on the period that 
includes the crises of 1999, 2001 and 2002. An econometric approach was used to 
estimate the parameters of equation (1). Notice that it is also necessary to specify 
parameters in equation (2). The choice of ci and λi must take into account the relative 
effects of k and β on the cost function and these specifications depend upon monetary 
policy choices. The estimated parameters of equation (1) are based on the following 
equation for the floating regime period of February 1999 to April 2004 using daily data: 
t t t t t a a r b a y ε ξ ξ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = Δ − − − 1 , 2 2 1 , 1 1 1 0        ( 3 )    
PTAX data published by the Central Bank of Brazil were used for exchange 
rates (y). Interest rate differentials (r) are calculated using Selic rates (domestic interest 
rates) and three months US Treasury Bill rates (foreign interest rates). The volumes of 
interventions with foreign currency (ξ1) and interventions with bonds and/or swaps (ξ2) 
were estimated using international reserves data and public announcements. 12 
 
GARCH, EGARCH and TGARCH models were tested and EGARCH(2,1) was 
considered the best based on Akaike and Schwarz criteria. Results are shown in the 
table 2. The coefficients all correspond to expectations, i.e. foreign currency (spot) and 
bond sales and increasing interest rates have negative impacts on the foreign exchange 
rate (domestic currency appreciation). Nevertheless, coefficients for bonds and swaps 
operations were not statistically significant at a 95% confidence level, but did show 
statistical significance at a 90% confidence level.  
Table 2 - Estimated results for equation (3)  
   Constant Interv. Spot Interv. Bonds Interst rate dif.
Coefficients 0.0020 -0.0045 -0.0025 -0.0110
p-values 0.001 0.020 0.091 0.008
Source: Silva Junior, Cajueiro and Yoneyama (2004) 
 
Since the impacts of exchange rate interventions have been estimated, it is 
necessary to specify the parameters of the cost function. These parameters reflect the 
weights that central bank considers for exchange rate deviations from an "implicit 
target", and the costs of each kind of intervention, as discussed earlier. In fact it is not 
easy to specify these parameters and they reflect a more general policy for international 
reserves management, domestic debt structure, monetary policy etc.  
Silva Junior, Cajueiro and Yoneyama (2004) specified the costs parameters for 
simulation purposes taking into account Brazil's exchange rate volatility, interest rates, 
estimated intervention using reserves, bonds, swaps and the estimated parameters of 
table 2. Furthermore, as in table 1, they run simulations including an exchange rate drift 
of 0.01, five times the normal rate (0.002), considering this number to be typical in 
periods of exchange rate devaluation pressure.  
Now, we are going to evaluate the policy of accumulating international reserves 
and reducing foreign exchange rate short exposure on the domestic debt. The Brazilian 
government has applied this strategy since 2004. The international environment of high 
demand for commodities and goods and high international liquidity made the 
implementation of this strategy possible since Brazil has accumulated a large current 13 
 
account surplus. The parameters for drift (0.01) and volatility (0.045) used in table 1 of 
this paper are the same as those observed during the international crisis in 2008. We 
then calibrated the cost function in order to evaluate how higher international reserves 
and low short foreign exchange rate exposure helped the country during the crisis. The 
parameters of equation (2) for a base case were: 
k=0.1;   β=0.0005;  ρ=0.000595  
c1=1.25E-5; c2=1.25E-5;  λ1=6E-5;  λ2=6E-5 
Based on the identification and calibration above we simulated some scenarios. 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the behavior of the model and to discuss the 
strategies for risk management of foreign exchange rate adopted by the Brazilian 
government. The results of a simulation for the base case are presented in the first row 
of table 3. For simulation purposes, it is considered that the implicit exchange rate target 
during the crisis in 2008 was R$/US$ 2.0. So, in the base case we have a continuous 
intervention using the SELIC interest rate equal to 15.1%, a daily spot intervention 
equal to US$ 565 million and a daily swap intervention of US$ 314 million when the 
foreign exchange rate reaches R$/US$ 2.151.  
Table 3 – Simulation of Risk Management Strategies 
k beta lam1 lam2  SELIC Qsi1 Qsi2 PTAX Case
x 102  x 104  x 105 x 105
5 5.5 6 6 15.1 565 314 2.151 Base
1 5.5 6 6 15.1 564 313 2.248 Flexibility with PTAX
5 5.5 4 6 12.8 719 267 2.144 High Lev Int Reserves
5 5.5 8 6 16.7 470 348 2.156 Low Lev Int Reserves
5 5.5 6 4 14.2 533 445 2.148 Low FX in the Debt
5 5.5 6 8 15.5 582 242 2.152 High FX in the Debt
5 5.5 8 8 17.4 489 271 2.158 Low Int Reserves High FX in the Debt
5 5.5 4 4 12.3 691 384 2.142 High Int Reserves Low FX in the Debt  
 
The second simulation supposes that we have more flexibility with the PTAX 
(we reduce the k coefficient of the cost function) and the model suggests that we should 
intervene only if the PTAX reaches a higher value of R$/US$ 2.248. In the third 
simulation we assume that the country has a higher volume of international reserves (we 
reduce the λ1 coefficient in the cost function). Note that in this case we intervene more 
in the spot market and may use a lower interest rate (continuous intervention) and less 
swaps. Otherwise, as we can see in the fourth simulation with less international reserves 14 
 
available to the country, burdens are higher in terms of interest rates and swaps. The 
fifth simulation supposes that there is more flexibility in using swaps since the domestic 
public debt is not too short on PTAX (we reduce the λ2 coefficient in the cost function). 
It is also possible to intervene with lower interest rates and in this case with lower 
international reserves. The sixth simulation shows the opposite of the fifth. In the 
seventh simulation with higher λ1 and λ2 coefficients the country needs to intervene with 
higher interest rates and we can see the opposite in the last simulation. Note that the 
interest rate difference between the last two simulations is 5%. This means that with a 
high level of international reserves and low short (or even long) foreign exchange rate 
exposure of the public debt, the intense use of interest rates in a financial crisis may be 
avoided. 
Figures 3 and 4 highlight the fact that holding international reserves and having 
long foreign exchange rate exposure with swaps operations allows the central bank to be 
more parsimonious in using interest rates during crisis events. For an emerging market 
economy this is an important issue. Indeed, Silva Junior, Cajueiro and Yoneyama 
(2004) and Silva Junior (2005) discussed the optimal impulse stochastic control strategy 
and argued that the government’s strategy should be to accumulate higher levels of 
international reserves and/or not to have a short position in swaps at times when there is 
no stress in the market
7. This strategy would allow the country to avoid the intensive use 
of interest rates during financial crises. In the brief simulation example shown in table 2, 
the estimation and calibration of the model suggest that the benefit of having flexibility 
with international reserves and swaps would avoid a 5% increase in interest rates when 
compared with a low flexibility scenario. 
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Figure 4 – Daily interventions as a function of λ1 and λ2 
 
4. Brazilian Risk Management Strategy 
Based on this model, the central bank may intervene in the market using interest rates, 
foreign reserves or swaps. It is considered here that these interventions will only be 
made in financial crisis to smooth the foreign exchange rate variations which may 
disrupt the country’s economy. This is an important remark in terms of the objectives of 16 
 
this paper since in a period when there is no financial stress, interest rates are used only 
for monetary policy purposes
8.  
Remember also that an increase in interest rates to attract international capital 
and to avoid domestic currency depreciation has a fiscal cost and may impact economic 
activity and decrease GDP growth. On the other hand, holding international reserves has 
a carry cost since domestic interest rates are higher than the interest rates of highly rated 
government bonds in which most of the reserves are invested. The literature regarding 
adequacy of holdings of international reserves therefore generally addresses two aspects 
of determining their optimal level. The first is related to the carry costs. The second 
aspect is related to the benefits of holding international reserves since they work as a 
self insurance mechanism to avoid crisis. Higher levels of international reserves may 
reduce the impact of a crisis on GDP growth and may reduce the cost of borrowing 
money abroad. With a low level of reserves carry costs are lower but borrowing costs 
abroad are higher and the country’s exposure to a financial crisis likewise.  
In fact, a long foreign exchange rate position in swaps operations also has a 
carry cost for the country since a long foreign exchange rate position with swaps works 
in the same way as holding international reserves. Note that one interesting feature of 
swaps operations is the possibility to have a short foreign exchange rate position. This 
allows the country to use these operations as a substitute for international reserves. 
Nevertheless, having a short exchange rate position with swaps or bonds may increase 
the short exchange rate exposure of the domestic debt. For instance, consider a scenario 
of low holdings of international reserves. In the event of a crisis the central bank could 
intervene by taking short foreign exchange rate positions in swaps operations. But the 
central bank cannot do this indefinitely since domestic debt structure may be affected 
and the participants in the financial market would be concerned about the country’s 
ability to pay its domestic debt in a scenario of speculative attacks which may devaluate 
the domestic currency and even increase the domestic debt
9. A long foreign exchange 
rate exposure works in the opposite direction during a crisis. A devaluation of the 
domestic currency in a crisis makes a positive impact by reducing the sovereign net 
domestic debt. 
                                                 
8 In the case of Brazil interest rates are used in the inflation targeting program. 
9 In the period that includes the contagion from the Argentinian crisis (2001) and the stress with the 2002 
elections there was a high level of short foreign exchange rate exposure of the domestic debt in Brazil.  17 
 
Let’s now evaluate Brazilian risk management strategy for foreign exchange rate 
exposure after 2004 and discuss how the country managed the occurrence of the 
international crisis in 2008. Figure 5 shows the R$/US$ exchange rate and the 
appreciation of the real after 2004 is very clear. The appreciation of the real was a 
consequence of several factors such as the boom in commodity prices and liquidity in 
the international markets. This economic environment made the Brazilian strategy to 
increase holdings of international reserves possible, and in 2006 this trend was 
accelerated. Figure 6 shows Brazilian holdings of international reserves. This trend to 
increase holdings of international reserves was not specific to Brazil. Several emerging 
market economies did the same, although the motivations may have been different from 
one country to another. Some countries, for instance, try to manage the foreign 
exchange rate for trade purposes. It does not seem to be the case in Brazil since the 
foreign exchange rate regime is floating and figure 5 makes it clear that there is no 
target level or even a band for the foreign exchange rate. Furthermore, it is important to 
note how severe the 2008 crisis was for the foreign exchange rate, since it varies 
between 1.56 and 2.5.  
 
Figure 5 – R$/US$ Exchange Rate  18 
 
 
Figure 6 – Holdings of International Reserves (US$ billions) 
 
In figure 7 we can see that the short exposure of the foreign exchange rate with 
swaps was reduced after 2003 and the government reverted to a long position in foreign 
exchange rate exposure that amounted to US$ 22 billion by September 2008
10. As a 
result of interventions the short exposure of the foreign exchange rate reached US$ 12 
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Figure 7 – Swaps position (US$ billions) 
                                                 
10 Short exposure is represented in the figure with a negative sign and long exposure is represented with a 
positive sign. 19 
 
Figure 8 shows the behavior of the domestic interest rate in Brazil. In the period 
of the 2008 crisis it was not necessary to increase the interest rate in Brazil dramatically. 
In fact there was a prior tendency to increase interest rates as part of a tightening of 
monetary policy due to inflation figures. The high level of international reserves and the 
flexibility available due to swap positions allowed the central bank to avoid intervening 




Figure 8 – Domestic interest rate in Brazil (%) 
In table 4 we compare the interventions of the Central Bank of Brazil in three 
periods of crisis
11. In 2002, the central bank intervened with higher interest rates 
compared to the year of 2001. Silva Junior, Cajueiro and Yoneyama (2004) and Silva 
Junior (2005) argued that the short exposure of the public debt to the foreign exchange 
rate was too high in 2002 and there was serious concern regarding public debt solvency. 
This was evidence that the impulse stochastic control model fits the central bank’s 
behavior during a crisis. In 2008, the government strategy of increasing international 
reserves and reducing short exposure of the foreign exchange rate in the public debt 
allowed the central bank to operate its monetary policy without major concern about 
increasing interest rates. In other words, interventions with international reserves and 
                                                 
11 Figures for the 2001 and 2002 periods were extracted from Silva Junior, Cajueiro and Yoneyama (2004). 20 
 
swaps were higher in 2008 than in 2001 and 2002, and interventions with interest rates 
were lower which is in the direction indicated by the model
12.  
 
Table 4 – Central Bank of Brazil interventions during financial crises 
   2001  2002  2008 
Interventions with international reserves(US$ bi)  8.2  7.4  12 
Interventions with swaps or bonds (US$ bi)  3.7  1.7  34 
Interest rate differential (%)  16.35  18.07  13.5 
 
The model discussed above is consistent with the Central Bank of Brazil’s 
behavior during crises. This model sheds light on the discussion about the carrying costs 
of international reserves for a country. Domestic interest rates are paid on domestic debt 
and in the case of Brazil domestic public debt was around R$ 1.4 trillion in 2009. So, if 
we consider that international reserves may help to prevent higher domestic interest 
rates we should discount the benefit of lower domestic debt costs from the carry costs of 
reserves. Of course we have to consider all the other benefits such as avoiding GDP 




In this paper we take a previous paper on the optimal impulse stochastic control 
problem for exchange rates, and discuss the Brazilian government’s strategy of 
increasing holdings of international reserves and reducing or eliminating short exposure 
to the foreign exchange rate of its public debt.  
Based on observation of the contagion from the Argentinian crisis in 2001, the 
stress associated with the presidential election in 2002, and the spillover from the 
international crisis of 2008, we show that the model fits the Central Bank of Brazil’s 
reaction in a financial crisis. So, based on the model, higher intervention flexibility with 
international reserves and with swap operations allows the central bank to intervene less 
with interest rates during financial crises.  
                                                 
12Stone, Walker and Yasui (2009) discuss other measures adopted by the Central Bank of Brazil like 
auctions of credit lines to help compensate for the loss of dollar export credit lines for Brazilian 
companies, the program to lend dollars against dollar denominated collateral and the announcement of a 
swap line with the Fed among other measures. 21 
 
It is worth to analyzing the interactions among the variables i.e. the interactions 
among the interest rate, international reserves and swaps. The simulations presented in 
this paper make it clear that, in the optimal intervention model for the risk management 
of foreign exchange rate exposure during a crisis; higher holdings of international 
reserves may avoid the need for higher interest rates. Simulations also make it clear that 
the use of swaps allows more flexibility in monetary policy operations in the event of a 
crisis. It may also reduce the need for higher interest rates and holdings of international 
reserves.  
Thus, it is important to highlight that the risk management decision of the 
government to increase international reserves and to reduce short foreign exchange rate 
exposure from 2004 to 2008 made it possible for the Central Bank of Brazil to manage 
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Appendix I – The Optimal Impulse Stochastic Control Model 
We consider that during exchange rate crisis events, the monetary authority may use 
two kinds of control. The first is a continuous control using the interest rate (rs) and the 
second is an impulse control using interventions in the foreign exchange and domestic 
bond markets (ξ's). Hereinafter, impulse control based on foreign currency trading is 
also called spot intervention. This is widely applied by central banks around the world, 
as discussed above. We also consider that the central bank effects impulse control by 
purchasing or selling domestic currency bonds and swaps
13. This model is solved in 
Silva Junior, Cajueiro and Yoneyama (2004) and Silva Junior (2005). 
Consider Ω a given set, F a σ-algebra on Ω, and P a probability measure on the 
measurable space (Ω,F). Consider also the probability space (Ω,F,P) with a filtration Ft 
generated by a one dimensional Brownian motion that represents uncertainty in the 
economy. Thus, exchange rate is a random variable, i.e. a function mapping Ω in R. We 
define the exchange rate Yt as domestic currency units per unit of foreign currency at 
time t, and we assume that Y is an adapted stochastic process given by: 
∑ ∑ ∫ ∫
≤ ≤
















, 1 1 0 0      ( 1 )  
where, 
Yt  is the exchange rate stochastic process starting at y; 
p  is the exogenous economic pressure on the exchange rate; 
b.rs  is the influence of interest rate (rs) on the exchange rate. Here interest rate 
corresponds to the difference between domestic and foreign interest rates; 
σ  is a positive constant; 
Bt  is the Brownian motion; 
a1.ξ1  is the influence of interventions in the exchange rate of buying (ξ<0) or selling 
(ξ>0) a total amount ξ of foreign currency; 
a2.ξ2  is the influence of interventions in the exchange rate of buying (ξ<0) or selling 
(ξ>0) a total amount ξ of swaps between foreign exchange rate and interest rates 
                                                 
13 The Central Bank of Brazil uses this kind of intervention. 25 
 
in local currency, and bonds in domestic currency that pay foreign exchange rate 
changes. 
The exogenous economic pressure on the exchange rate p and the additional 
impulse control ξ2 are introduced here as modifications to the model given in MO. For 
optimal control it is necessary to establish a performance function to be minimized and 
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where ρ is the discount rate, m is a target value for the exchange rate, 
_
r  is a reference 
value for the interest rate
14 and k, β, λ1, λ2, c1, c2   are performance parameters. T  ∞ ≤  
is a given (fixed) future time and E
y is the expectation with respect to the probability 
law of Yt. We assume that the system starts at the state x=(s,y). 
Unlike MO we use a quadratic loss function for spot interventions. So, we 
assume that larger interventions have a higher weight in the performance function than 
that assumed by MO and CZ. 
Let U denote the set of continuous controls u:R
n→U. The set of continuous 
controls  U  comprises the interest rate r=(rt)t∈R. Suppose that in a given state the 
monetary authority decides to intervene and give the system an impulse control 
ξ∈Z⊂R
l, where Z is a given set of admissible impulse values. The aim is to find a set of 
combined controls (rt, ξt) in equation (1) that minimizes the performance function of 
equation (2). This combined control comprises the continuous control and the impulse 
control. The solution of this system is attained with quasivariational Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) inequalities.  
The impulse control is applied at discrete times θj with selected amounts ξ1j and 
ξ2j of interventions in foreign exchange and bond markets respectively. V denotes the 
set of all impulse controls. The sequence υ=(θ1, θ2,…, θN; ξ11, ξ12,… ξ1N; ξ21, ξ22,… ξ2N 
) is called the impulse control. The combined stochastic control is the set W=UxV, 
                                                 
14 We consider this reference rate to be equal to zero, as a simplification attained by axis translation. 26 
 
which comprises stochastic (continuous) control and impulse control. Considering only 
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is an Ito diffusion. The probability law of Xt
(w) is Q
x,w. It is possible to associate a 
second order partial differential operator L to this diffusion. The connection between L 
and  Yt is that L is the generator of the process X in C0
2(R
2), the space of twice 
continuously differentiable functions on R
2 with compact support, with the following 
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which is defined for all functions f:R
2→R for which the derivatives involved exist at 
x=(s,y).  
In this case, continuous control describes a Markov control, since functions fu=-
b.rs and the "crisis function" fc=p in equation (1) do not depend on the start point 
x=(s,y). The values we chose at time t for these functions depend only on the state of the 
system at this time
15. The aim is to find the optimal control since: 
() () x J x
w
W w∈ = Λ inf           ( 5 )  
In this paper we use different functions from MO’s example since we include a 
drift  p  and quadratic cost functions for interventions. We point out that p-b.rs is a 
Lipschitz continuous function and the performance function always has the same sign 
and is locally bounded away from zero as required by Brekke and Oksendal (1997)
 16.  
Let H denote the space of all measurable functions h: R
2→ R. Thus, we define 
the intervention operator (or switching operator) M : H → H by: 
                                                 
15 See Oksendal (1995). 
16 Brekke and Oksendal (1997) present a verification theorem for combined stochastic control and 
impulse control, and Mundaca and Oksendal (1998) use this result. 27 
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ρ ξ ξ γ
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∈ + + = , inf ,        ( 6 )  
for all h∈ H, and x∈ R. Using MO Theorem 1 it can be stated that there exists a 
continuous function φ:R
2→[0,∞) with the following properties: 
φ is stochastically C
2 with respect to Xt
(r) for all r:R
2→R       (7) 
φ ≤ Mφ on R
2           (8) 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ,
2 2 ≥ + − +
− r m y k e y s L
s r β φ
ρ        (9) 
for almost all (s,y) with respect to the Green measure for Xt(r), for all r=r(s,y): R
2→ R. 
Thus, according to MO: 
() () x J x
w ≤ φ  for all w∈ W         (10) 




2→ R such that the minimal value zero on the left hand side of Eq. (9) is attained, i.e. 
() () ( ) () 0 ,
2 2 ,
^
= + − +
− r m y k e y s L
s y s r β φ
ρ          (11) 
for all (s,y)∈D, where 
() () } ; { : x M x x D φ φ < =          (12) 
Define the impulse control 
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to Xt, and  
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θ φ , for all x∈R       (17) 
Thus, according to Brekke and Oksendal (1996):  
() () x x Λ = φ            (18) 
and the optimal combined stochastic control is  W w w ∈ =
^
* . 
The above result is known as a quasi-variational inequality (QVI) solution for a 
classical-impulse control problem. A function φ satisfies the QVI for the classical-
impulse stochastic control problem if equations (8), (9) and (11) hold. In Perthame 
(1984a) we may find a version of the dynamic programming principle for the classical-
impulse stochastic control problem and its Theorem 2 is a result related to Brekke and 
Oksendal (1997), although it is insufficient for this application. Perthame (1984b) 
studied the existence and uniqueness of a similar QVI. Cadenillas and Zapatero (2000) 
also present a version of the dynamic programming principle for their application. 29 
 
The solution φ of the QVI separates two regions. The continuum region is 
defined by equation (12), where no intervention in the foreign exchange market 
(impulse control) should be made while Xt is in D. When Xt reaches the boundary of D, 
see equation (13), we apply an intervention and Xt returns to D. 
We use the above QVI result to find the final solution for our problem. So, 
considering m=0 as a simplification attained by axis translation, and using the partial 
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This value of α is a candidate for the optimal control using interest rates. 
Substituting this value α in equation (19), the left side must be equal to zero in region D 
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As a candidate for the minimum of Λ(s,y) the following function is used: 
() ( ) y e y s
sψ φ
ρ − = ,           ( 2 3 )  
for a suited function Ψ (to be determined). Consider also that D=Rx(-η,η), by 
symmetry, for a suited value of η ∈ (0,∞). The interval (-η,η) is interpreted as a band of 
admissible values for the foreign exchange rate, where there are no interventions by 30 
 
central bank in the foreign exchange rate market. Applying equation (23) to equation 
(22) the following result is attained: 
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Considering only the case where y>0, the solution of equation (24) is: 
() ( ) () () y E y Cf y f B y Af y f − = − − −
2 ' ) ( ' ) ( ' '       ( 2 6 )  
() () T y 0     ; 0 0 '     ; 0 ≤ ≤ = = f z f         ( 2 7 )  
For a given z>0, f(y) = fz(y) is the solution of the above system. Consider that 
there is a z>0 with at least two different values of y∈(0,T), y1<y2<T, where: 
() () ()
* *
2 1 , ' ' λ a Q y f y f z z = =          ( 2 8 )  
The two smallest positive numbers with this property are chosen and a
* and λ
* 
are the vectors of a's and λ's coefficients of equations (1) and (2). The exchange rate 
trigger level for intervention is chosen as η=y2 and as the candidate for the value 
function Ψ in the interval [0, η] it is chosen: 
() () η ψ ≤ ≤ = y y f y z 0     ;          ( 2 9 )  
The key point here is the determination of function Q(a
*,λ
*), since it establishes 
the connection between continuous and impulse control. Thus, according to MO the 
next step is to consider a switching operator defined by: 
() ( ) () ( ) () } {
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ρ
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or, since  () ( )
s e y y s
ρ ψ φ
− = ,  : 
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Minimization of equation (32) gives the inf of equation (31):  
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First order condition gives in the point defined by  ()    
^ ^




























































ξ λ ξ λ
ξ ξ ψ a Q
a a





⎛ − −       ( 3 3 )  
From equations (23) and (29) it can be stated that function Ψ(y) defines a 
candidate for the minimal performance function. Thus, equations (28) and (33) are the 
connection between continuous and impulse controls, then 
i
i





− =           ( 3 4 )  
If y=η (the trigger level) and since  
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This means that the monetary authority intervenes continuously using interest 
rates when φ is strictly smaller than Mφ and the monetary authority intervenes 
discontinuously (buying or selling reserves, bonds and swaps) whenever φ = Mφ. The 
size of intervention is the solution to the optimization problem. The system of equations 
has six unknown variables: z, α, y1, y2, ξ1 and ξ2. There is no analytical solution to this 
combined control problem as solution of the ordinary differential equation (26) is 
numerical.  
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